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Illicit Pharmaceutical Networks in Europe:  
Organising the Illicit Medicine Market in the United Kingdom and the 
Netherlands 
 
Alexandra Hall, Rosa Koenraadt and Georgios A. Antonopoulos 
 
Abstract 
It has been widely suggested that the global market in counterfeit, falsified and illegally traded 
medicines has expanded at a tremendous rate in recent years, offering lucrative opportunities 
for criminal entrepreneurs with little legal risk. However, with a few exceptions, there has been 
little criminological research conducted on the trade’s actors and organisation. Of the few 
studies that are available, most position the supply of these products in the context of 
‘transnational organised crime’, often presupposing the overwhelming presence of large-scale, 
hierarchical structures in the trade. This article, based on two extensive research projects in the 
United Kingdom and the Netherlands, offers an account of the illicit supply of medicines in 
two European jurisdictions. The research outlines the nature and dynamics of the trade 
including the roles played by each national context as nodes in the global supply chain. The 
focus then shifts to the modus operandi, actors, online trade and social organisation in both 
countries. In contradistinction to the ‘transnational organised crime’ narrative, the empirical 
data outlined in this paper demonstrates that actors and networks involved in the trade are 
highly flexible and complex structures that straddle the categories of licit and illicit, online and 
offline, and global and local. This suggests that operations supplying illicit medicines vary 
largely in terms of size, reach, organisation and legality. 
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Introduction 
The market in counterfeit, falsified and illegal traded medicines is not a new phenomenon. Bate 
(2008) suggests that counterfeit pharmaceuticals have been around since the nineteenth 
century, when technology advanced and criminal entrepreneurs involved in counterfeiting 
began producing and distributing fake goods that offered the most lucrative opportunities with 
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minimum legal risk. In recent years, it has been suggested that the trade is expanding at a 
tremendous rate (Blackstone, 2014; Interpol, 2014; WHO, 2012). The World Health 
Organization (WHO) first became aware of the public health issues associated with counterfeit 
medicines in 1985 and by 2010 they estimated that the global counterfeit pharmaceutical 
market had a turnover of 75 billion dollars (WHO, 2012). Other more recent estimates claim a 
global market in illicit pharmaceuticals worth $200 billion is in operation, highlighting a 90 
per cent increase in revenues since 2005 (IRACM, 2013). In Europe, according to a relatively 
recent study of 5,000 European citizens across five nation states, 5% of consumers suspected 
that they had received a counterfeit prescription drug while 1% were sure they had. This would 
suggest that up to 12.8 million consumers were exposed to counterfeit medicines in those 
countries (Jackson et al., 2012). Moreover, the head of Interpol’s pharmaceutical crime sub-
directorate estimated that across the world up to 1 million people die each year after consuming 
counterfeit medicinal drugs, most of whom reside in developing nations (see Southwick, 2013; 
Ossola, 2015). Health risks are primarily present in cases of substandard medicines that contain 
unsafe or poisonous substances or lifesaving medical treatments that lack the effective 
ingredients (Degardin et al, 2014; Buckley & Gostin, 2013). 
Despite the worldwide scope and seemingly increasing revenues associated with the 
trade, as well as the serious health implications it may pose for patients and consumers, 
criminological research remains limited. Of the few studies that are available, most position 
the supply of these products in the context of ‘transnational organised crime’, often 
presupposing the overwhelming presence of large-scale, hierarchical structures in the trade 
(UNICRI, 2009; Attaran et al., 2011; Bate, 2012; cf. Lavorgna, 2014). It has been suggested 
that the proximity of illegal drugs markets and pharmaceutical markets - in terms of the active 
pharmaceutical ingredients and precursors - as well as the relatively lenient penalties for the 
trafficking of pharmaceuticals compared to other illegal drugs, has encouraged hierarchical, 
‘transnational’ organised crime entities to engage in the trade. For example, the President of 
the World Anti-Illicit Traffic Organization and “fake medicines” Commission of the OECD 
Task Force on Charting Illicit Trade (TF-CIT) argued that counterfeiting and the illegal sale of 
pharmaceuticals is the “ideal transnational crime” (Delval, 2015: 21) and that “Mafia-type 
organisations see the [fake medicine] market as an inexhaustible source of revenue without 
major criminal risk” (Delval, 2015:15). Such representatives suggest the Russian Mafia, 
Chinese Triads and Colombian Cartels have moved into the trade. This is a view shared by law 
enforcement, the mainstream media and the legal pharmaceutical industry (see, for example, 
IRACM, 2013).   
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Indeed, statistical representations and mainstream analyses should be met with some 
caution. Estimating the worldwide prevalence of counterfeit pharmaceutical drugs is 
problematic because detection remains difficult, while some pharmaceutical companies, nation 
states and consumers remain reluctant to report instances of counterfeiting (Newton et al., 
2006; Chika et al., 2011). Another problem associated with statistical representations of the 
size and scope of the market relates to the broader trade in various categories of illicitly traded 
medicinal products and the on-going debate surrounding the terminology used to define them. 
There is a consensus that counterfeit medicines may pose a threat to public health. However, a 
terminological debate has arisen because, on the one hand, problems with illicit medicines are 
not confined to trademark infringement alone and, on the other, simply punishing intellectual 
property infringements does not take the public health risk into consideration (Degardin et al., 
2014). To date, there is no agreement on which terminology to use. As a result, various terms 
are in use in different contexts. These include: counterfeit medicines, which relates to products 
that infringe intellectual property rights (WHO, 2012); falsified medicines, which is a broader 
term encompassing all pharmaceuticals falsely claiming to be an authentic product (IRACM, 
2013); substandard medicines that are genuine products that do not meet national regulatory 
standards (Buckley & Gostin, 2013; Degardin et al, 2014); and unlicensed pharmaceutical 
drugs, which can be generic or branded products legally produced abroad yet sold in a country 
with different licensing agreements in order to by-pass existing intellectual property laws and 
patents (MHRA, 2013). To overcome this definitional confusion, in the current paper we use 
the term ‘illicit medicines’ to encompass all types of counterfeit, falsified and illegal traded 
pharmaceuticals. Therefore, this term includes the trade in adulterated and counterfeit 
medicines as well as medicines sold without a license.  
Furthermore, the statistics and accounts available should not be taken at face value. 
They represent the political interests of various organisations and stakeholders and can be 
skewed to suit their interests; the economic interests of big pharma being a significant example 
here. There is a rich literature on the technical and substantive problems associated with 
positivist criminology and ‘the numbers game’ (see for example Young, 2004). However, while 
acknowledging the problems associated with definitional issues and statistical estimates, this 
paper, taking into account all of the above product categories and a broad range of primary and 
secondary data sources, supports the contention widely accepted among experts that there is a 
large and growing market in illicit medicines. However, that it is impossible to quantify 
accurately. This simply proves the need for further research involving multi-sited, in-depth, 
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data collection (Hall and Winlow, 2015) that is capable of capturing a more detailed and 
accurate picture of the trade’s complex dynamics. 
Drawing on extensive data gathered as part of two large-scale projects in the United 
Kingdom (UK) and the Netherlands, the aim of this paper is to outline the modus operandi, 
actors and social organisation of the illicit medicine market in two European jurisdictions. In 
terms of organising illegal trades (see, for example, van Duyne, 2003b) and criminal justice 
responses, the UK and the Netherlands are integral parts of what Europol (2008) regards as the 
‘Northwest hub of organised crime’ in its Organised Crime Threat Assessment (OCTA): a 
region characterised by “major transport infrastructures, different tax regimes, geographical 
proximity to various Member States and a flourishing economy which offers possibilities that 
can and are exploited by organised crime” (Europol, 2008: 33). As will become clear, in the 
context of the global trade in illicit medicines, both national contexts act as integral hubs of 
production, transit and distribution. Therefore, the article offers an in-depth account of the 
illicit market in pharmaceuticals in two national contexts that are also essential nodes in the 
global supply chain. The paper provides a unique insight into how illicit suppliers of medicines 
in both countries circumvent and exploit national and virtual borders. In contradistinction to 
the ‘transnational organised crime’ narrative, the empirical data outlined in this paper show 
that actors involved in the illicit supply of medicines in the two contexts often belong to loosely 
structured networks. These networks straddle what are often presented as the dichotomies of 
licit/illicit, online/offline and global/local, making use of variations in national regulatory 
standards and economic opportunities over borders, as well as increasingly innovative digital 
commercial techniques. This suggests operations supplying illicit medicines vary largely in 
terms of size, reach, organisation and legality. 
 
Methodology 
This paper is based on two in-depth research projects exploring the illicit medicine trade in the 
UK and the Netherlands. The original impetus for this analysis came about during a number of 
discussions that took place between the researchers at related academic, law enforcement and 
industry conferences. Although the projects were conducted separately, the research teams 
determined a great deal of similarity in each national context that warranted further exploration 
and discussion in the academic literature. Indeed, it is becoming increasingly important to offer 
multi-sited accounts of social actors and criminological phenomena (Falzon, 2009).  
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The aim of the first study was to explore and examine the size, scope, nature and 
dynamics of the illicit medicine market in the UK, focusing on the demand and supply sides. 
It was primarily qualitative in nature and involved collecting in-depth data using a number of 
integrated methodological techniques in both online and offline contexts. First, primary data 
were collected via a UK-based virtual ethnography, which involved the researchers immersing 
themselves in a number of online communities and environments over time. This was done on 
a regular basis between June 2013 and March 2014, as well as on subsequent intermittent 
occasions. With regards to the supply-side in particular, this method was used to collect data 
from various online sellers and sites, which was then analysed, pooled and categorised in order 
to look for common patterns. The virtual ethnography allowed the researchers to collect rich 
data from online sites used for supply and, when accompanied by data collected from other 
sources, to begin to analyse the networks that have proliferated throughout the various stages 
of the trade that caters for consumer demand in the UK, as well as identifying connections 
between traders based in the UK and abroad. 
Second, data were collected via traditional ethnographic methods. The offline 
ethnography was primarily conducted in a gym in the Northeast of England in which the use 
and trade of anabolic steroids is widespread. The gym setting presented the opportunity to 
acquire knowledge regarding the ‘illicit’ use and supply of performance and image-enhancing 
drugs (PIEDs), predominantly anabolic steroids, as well as a number of other pharmaceutical 
products (see Antonopoulos and Hall, 2016). Further observations and interviews were 
conducted with a range of consumers, suppliers and professionals outside of the gym setting, 
who predominantly reside in two urban areas in Northeast England. In the adoption of an 
ethnographic approach (see Hall, forthcoming), the fieldwork required building rapport in order 
to observe and experience a social environment alongside research participants over extended 
periods. Having lived in these locales for a number of years helped the researchers who have 
personal networks and key contacts in the areas and felt confident in their ability to have an 
‘immersive experience’ (see Desmond: 2016; see also Hobbs, 1988; Adler, 1998; Winlow, 
2001).  In total, 45 semi-structured interviews took place. Interviews were conducted as free-
flowing conversations with participants on a series of occasions between January 2014 and 
February 2015. Most of the interviews were quite informal and brief, in which a few questions 
were asked yet usable data were received (see Schwalbe and Wolkomir, 2003). 
Third, data were collected from a range of other sources in order to effectively 
triangulate and add credibility to the findings (Thomsen, 1998). Data from judicial and 
investigative cases, statistics from law enforcement and regulatory agencies, interviews with 
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relevant stakeholders and enforcement officers, and secondary media and academic sources 
were gathered and analysed. Specifically, data from the UK Medicines and Healthcare products 
Regulatory Agency (MHRA) – the primary regulatory and enforcement agency working in this 
area in the UK – the National Crime Agency (NCA) and Interpol were collected. This included 
gathering statistics and conducting semi-structured interviews and general discussions with 
practitioners in these organisations in the UK. Six investigative and judicial case files relating 
to pharmaceutical crime were accessed at the MHRA. These files were concerned with some 
of the most serious cases in the UK to date. Each case file included detailed intelligence and a 
picture of the nature and dynamics of the supply of illicit pharmaceutical products, including 
information on the social organisation of the trade, its financial management, and a range of 
marketing and advertising tactics adopted by illicit pharmaceutical traders. 
The second study primarily focused on the supply and demand processes associated 
with the trade in illicit medicines in the Netherlands. Primary in-depth data were gathered by 
using a multi-method approach that combined quantitative and qualitative research methods. 
First, court cases were analysed to discern patterns of the sale or trade of illicit medicines. In 
the Netherlands, a range of regulatory institutions generally conducts investigations on the 
illicit pharmaceutical trade. Therefore, 69 Dutch case files were selected and analysed at the 
Health Care Inspectorate (Inspectie voor de Gezondheidszorg), the Public Prosecution Service 
(Openbaar Ministerie) and the Fiscal Information and Investigation Service (Fiscale 
Inlichtingen- en Opsporingsdienst). Through wiretapped conversations, interrogations and 
other materials, the case files contained in-depth information on the types of medicines traded, 
methods of supply, criminal cooperation, social organisation of the trade and market dynamics. 
Second, 78 semi-structured interviews were held with suppliers (N=30), consumers 
(N=9) and various officials (N=38). The interviews with consumers and suppliers provided in-
depth knowledge on their activities, ideas and motives. The respondents were recruited online 
or in person by snowball sampling (Decorte & Zaitch, 2010; Davies et al., 2011) and were 
usually spoken to during several occasions in order to increase trust (see also Koenraadt, 2012; 
2015). The interviews took place in the work environment of the respondents, in public places 
such as restaurants or bars, or over the phone. All interviews lasted between one and three 
hours. Almost all were recorded with a voice recorder and transcribed at a later stage.  
Third, an online analysis of 17 websites and discussion platforms on which medicines 
were sold and discussed was conducted. The online analysis revealed additional information 
on the types of illicit medicines offered online, the language used, payment systems, shipping 
methods and contact information. Fourth, quantitative data were obtained through a survey 
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study in the Netherlands. A prevalence study was conducted among a panel of 50,860 Dutch 
respondents, after which an in-depth study among 985 consumers of illicit medicines took 
place. The in-depth study included 447 respondents that purchased medicines online and 
consisted of 60 questions divided into various themes, such as purchasing behaviour, 
satisfaction, motivations and risk perception (see also Koenraadt & de Haan, 2016).  
The fact that suppliers, traders and consumers in illicit markets generally try to remain 
hidden from law enforcement is banal but important to remember. Qualitative and online data 
sources can reveal a lot of detailed information about these evasive market actors, but it cannot 
be generalised to a larger population. Furthermore, official data usually contains selective 
information (Hobbs and Antonopoulos, 2014). Therefore, both research projects have 
combined multiple data sources in order to triangulate the research data and overcome the 
limitations associated with each individual research method. This paper draws on findings from 
all of the data sources above. Focusing on the supply side, it will integrate these sources and 
include interview data and summarise several exemplary case files from both research projects. 
These cases have been chosen because they are the most representative of the data obtained by 
using all the methods outlined above in both the UK and the Netherlands. The aim of presenting 
these cases is for illustrative purposes. 
 
The illicit medicine market in the UK and the Netherlands 
The global market in illicit medicines concerns almost all types of pharmaceutical drugs, 
ranging from sexual enhancers to antibiotics and anticancer medication (WHO, 2012). In the 
Global South, illicit lifesaving medicines used to treat diseases such as malaria, HIV and 
tuberculosis are supplied on the largest scale, while in the Global North, expensive products 
such as lifestyle medicines or newly patented medicines are more often illicitly distributed and 
sold (Wertheimer & Wang, 2012; Newton et al., 2006). These lifestyle medicines - also referred 
to as performance and image enhancing drugs (PIEDs) or enhancement medicines - lie on the 
borderline between health needs and lifestyle choices. The category includes sexual enhancers, 
anabolic steroids, hormones, weight loss medicines and products to treat hair loss (Gilbert et 
al., 2000; Young, 2003; Evans-Brown et al., 2012; Koenraadt, 2012; 2014).  
Data collected from the MHRA relating to enforcement operations, including seizures 
during raids from 2009-2014, identified the main illicit medicines currently being supplied in 
the UK as erectile dysfunction drugs (90%), anabolic steroids, weight loss and hair loss 
medicines (see also MHRA, 2013). During the fieldwork undertaken both online and offline a 
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similar picture emerged but thriving markets in illicit sedatives, opioid analgesics, antibiotics, 
psychiatric drugs, fertility drugs and stimulants were also identified. The UK research 
identified a particularly large market in illicit erectile dysfunction medicines and anabolic 
steroids (see also Yar, 2008). For the basic reasons of saving embarrassment and avoiding 
stigma (see Cordell et al., 1996; Albers-Miller, 1999), most people prefer to order Viagra and 
other drugs used to treat erectile dysfunction online, and a large proportion of these products 
are counterfeit, falsified or illegally traded. In gym and bodybuilding subcultures in the UK the 
demand for steroids and various appetite suppressants and supplements is high, and there is 
evidence suggesting a large counterfeit market in operation. The market for anabolic steroids 
in the UK has in some respects moved online, particularly for those consumers who are not 
embedded in the gym and bodybuilding scene and do not have access to suppliers offline (see 
also Antonopoulos and Hall, 2016). Other factors contributing to the demand for various illicit 
medicines include the privatisation and individualisation of healthcare practices, and 
pharmaceutical drug diversion for recreational purposes and prescription drug misuse (see Hall 
& Antonopoulos, 2016).  
 The Netherlands resembles the UK insofar as most of the medicines traded are aimed 
at the lifestyle or ‘enhancement’ market. With a high demand for cheaper medicines or medical 
supplements that are rare in the Netherlands, a lively trade primarily exists in medicines that 
are being used for non-health and non-life-threatening conditions, and an increasing proportion 
of the Dutch population purchases these medicines online. In 2015, an estimated 10.2% of the 
population in the Netherlands had purchased medicines online, with at least 1.6% having 
purchased unofficial medicines (Koenraadt & de Haan, 2016). Sexual enhancers, weight loss 
medicines, and sedatives are by far the most popular illicit medicines purchased online 
(Koenraadt & de Haan, 2016). These findings coincide with literature and seizure statistics of 
the Dutch customs laboratory, in which sexual enhancers are the foremost seized medicine. In 
a recent study by the National Institute for Public Health and the Environment (Rijksinstituut 
voor Volkgezondheid en Milieu) based on sewage measurements, it was estimated that at least 
60% of the consumed sexual enhancers in the Netherlands were not legitimately obtained 
(Venhuis et al., 2014). While some consumers are actually aware of the risks and may wittingly 
purchase enhancing substances from unlicensed sources, others might not be aware they are 
consuming counterfeit or adulterated medicines (Venhuis et al., 2011; Koenraadt, 2012; Van 
de Ven & Mulrooney, 2016).  
 A full examination of the cultural, psycho-social and economic factors contributing to 
the demand is beyond the scope of this article (see Hall & Antonopoulos, 2016; Koenraadt, 
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2012). However, in short, we have found that the continuous search for enhanced bodily 
capital, improved performance and the transformation of the social self and identity is the main 
cultural context in which we now witness an increasingly high demand for various human 
enhancement drugs – both licit and illicit – in Western Europe (see Evans-Brown et al., 2012; 
Cederström & Spicer, 2015). Due to the high demand and widespread online availability of 
these medical substances, the consumption of illicit enhancement medicines has become a 
challenge for public health (Evans-Brown et al., 2012; Kimergård et al., 2014). 
Our research found that apart from a few small-scale operations, illicit medicines are 
generally not produced in the UK and most are imported through a variety of trade routes. 
Previous research suggests that a large proportion of illicit medicines entering the UK are 
produced in India, Pakistan, China and Russia (see Yar, 2008; Hall & Antonopoulos, 2016). 
Illicit medicine suppliers target the UK as both a transit zone and end-user market. As a transit 
zone located between producers and consumers in the USA and Western Europe packages 
reaching the UK can be redirected with a greater degree of ‘legitimacy’. This results in a large 
volume of illicit medicines transiting through the UK, some of which also target the end-user 
market because the higher price of medicines and the heightened consumption patterns in 
comparison to most other European countries produces higher profits. Enforcement officers 
informed us of the increasing number of small-scale packages that present a reduced financial 
risk for traders concerned about the risk of interception: 
“We are now seeing much smaller parcels coming through the post from overseas, we 
expect this is in response to large parcels not wanting to be risked anymore.” (Interview with 
British law enforcement agent) 
 Within the network of general European drugs markets, the Netherlands is recognized 
for its high levels of domestic production and exportation of cannabis and synthetic drugs, and 
for its significant role as a transit country within the illegal drugs trade more generally 
(UNODC, 2013; EMCDDA, 2016). In the illicit medicine trade, the Netherlands is a producing, 
transit and end-user market. Findings from the Netherlands suggest that the majority of illicit 
medicines entering the market are likewise manufactured in China, India, Pakistan or Thailand 
before being broken up into a number of smaller scale packages. However, in recent years, 
officials in the Netherlands are facing an increase in imported raw pharmaceutical materials 
and small production centres:  
“Since 1st of January, 2014, the import of bulk raw materials for the purpose of 
fabricating medicines has been made illegal. These raw materials are overall originating in 
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China, while most of the packages being sent from India contain the final medicines” 
(Interview with Dutch law enforcement agent).   
 Up until January 2014, the import of raw materials was poorly regulated and enforced, 
while importation of manufactured illicit medicines was more strictly controlled. As a result, 
increasing bulk powder and raw materials were being imported. According to law enforcement 
officers, the production of medicines within the Netherlands often occurs in conjunction with 
the manufacturing of other illegal drugs, such as ecstasy, or the production of PIEDs, such as 
steroids. 
 
Modus operandi and actors 
It is generally understood that the global trade in illicit medicines is widely dispersed in 
geographical space, following a typical pattern from production and distribution through to 
consumption. By means of a blooming and expanding pharmaceutical industry in both 
legitimate and illicit medicines, production centres are to be found mainly in South Asia (India 
and Pakistan), China, Hong Kong, Russia and Latin America, and distribution tends to be at its 
most active in large networks in parts of the Middle East, Africa and Central Europe (Hall & 
Antonopoulos, 2016). In Europe, the legal pharmaceutical supply chain is largely safe because 
of effective control policies set by national authorities (Bate, 2012). Thus, the illicit supply of 
medicines primarily takes place throughout ‘hidden’, illicit and online supply chains that span 
the globe, with limited products infiltrating the legitimate and strictly controlled supply chain 
(ibid; see also Lavorgna, 2014).  
Therefore, the supply chain of a batch of illicit medicines consumed in the Netherlands 
or the UK is likely to follow similar patterns and trading routes, with the medicines mainly 
being produced in Asian countries, especially China, India or Pakistan and distributed through 
other transit countries (e.g. Spain, Russia, Hungary). For example, as the following case 
suggests, the products are produced in Pakistan and India, trafficked to transit hubs after which 
they arrive in the Netherlands. The case shows patterns in the importation of counterfeit 
medicines similar to other cases. Multiple addresses, PO boxes and fake names are used and 
large amounts of pharmaceuticals are divided over small shipments. 
 
Case 1 (NL): Wholesale business 
Years of alleged offence: 2008-2013 
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A large-scale illicit medicine business was discovered after various parcels containing 
counterfeit medicines being shipped from the Netherlands to the UK were confiscated. The 
investigated wholesale business was centred around a key player who would primarily receive 
medicines from a wholesaler in Pakistan. The key figure was cooperating with three main 
fellow suspects in the Netherlands. The business mainly involved prescription medication such 
as Diazapam, Ritalin, Bromazepam, Oxycodon, and Iomax. The wholesaler in Pakistan would 
send packages to the Dutch main suspect, from which the medicines were sold to consumers, 
suppliers, resellers and middlemen, and sent to addresses in the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany, Denmark and the USA. Medicines were sent and received through various post boxes 
in different parts of the city. Buyers had to transfer money to a designated bank account, by 
referring to their own first name, while cash could be sent to different PO boxes. 
Source: Dutch Public Prosecution Service 
 
It appears that although the cases from law enforcement relating to activities and actors 
based in the UK and the Netherlands highlight a number of local and national particularities, 
global connections are necessary in order to obtain the products to sell. Therefore, global 
networks of the physical and financial flows of illicit medicinal products are important for our 
analysis. Another example is reflected in a UK case, in which a number of suspects whose bank 
accounts would be used to launder money were known to be living in Thailand, Greece, Turkey 
and Spain. The units and businesses implicated in the operation were based throughout the UK 
while the accounts and banking facilities were scattered across the globe. 
 
Case 2 (UK): Family and friends 
Years of alleged offence: 2004-2011. 
In 2004 a business purported to be trading in fishing tackle, electrical goods, cosmetics and 
jewellery was found to be selling both unlicensed and counterfeit erectile dysfunction drugs 
online. It was later found that the same operation was selling counterfeit Viagra and Valium 
offline. This was a large and complex operation involving twenty-one suspects with various 
organisational roles who were members of a close knit circle of family and friends based in 
two teams: one in the North and one in the South of England. Over 100 different merchant and 
business accounts were implicated in the case. This included the accounts of two of the main 
suspects’ mothers, one based in Greece, the other in Turkey. In the later stages banking moved 
offshore to Panama and Belize, where less questions were asked. A number of front companies 
were also set-up in order to provide business documentation if requested by the banks. 
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Evidence gathered highlighted (1) £11 million in various bank accounts and (2) receipts 
showing an average turnover of £60,000 per week, suggesting an annual turnover of £3 million. 
Source: MHRA files.   
 
An important recurring aspect in the majority of the court cases as well as the other data 
obtained in both countries is the interface between legitimate and illegitimate supply. For 
example, various cases demonstrate how a legitimate company can serve as a shield for the 
sale of illicit medicines. The fact that the suppliers own a legitimate company, or are employed 
by one, provides the opportunity to use the ambiguity of the legitimacy of their products to 
conceal illicit activities (Bowman, 2008; Kleemans & Van de Bunt, 2008; Passas, 2003). 
Suppliers on all levels can operate under the guise of a legitimate company and sell illicit 
medicines for extra income, while using it to expand their network and launder profits. In a 
large proportion of the 69 court files in the Netherlands, the suppliers involved had no criminal 
record. Instead, they were involved in various official companies involved in food supplement 
supply, national and international trading and the healthcare sector. At times, trading illicit 
medicines was linked to other criminal offenses, such as the illegal drugs trade (ecstasy, 
cocaine), other forms of counterfeiting (clothes, jewellery, cosmetics), or corruption and fraud 
in sectors such as healthcare. For example, one Dutch case outlines the business of a fraudulent 
doctor, who purported to be licensed to hold surgeries while selling counterfeit weight-loss 
medicines.  
 
Case 3 (NL): Fake doctor 
Years of alleged offence: 2011-2014 
This case involved a male suspect who posed as a certified medical doctor. With several 
patients he travelled to China for surgery, where the patients had to pay large amounts of 
money for their medical operations. He conducted smaller surgeries himself, without having a 
medical license. Besides that, the suspect was accused of prescribing counterfeit weight-loss 
medicines to his patients. During a house search, 13,680 counterfeit weight-loss capsules were 
found, 13,775 sachets of weight loss coffee, and 71,710 other illicit weight loss capsules. 
Shipping receipts were found that contained evidence of at least 620kg and 285kg of weight 
loss medicines sent from China to the Netherlands. 
Source: Dutch Public Prosecution Service 
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The data from both research projects reveal that many cases of illicit medicine supply are 
examples of opportunistic crime (see Ruggiero, 2000). This is committed by individuals and 
groups who already have some of the necessary infrastructure in place – businesses, contacts 
in the pharmaceutical industry, payment facilities and so on – to assist them in the supply of 
illicit medicinal products. Frequently, these existing businesses (gyms, shops, healthcare 
practices, online shops) are used as front companies and existing payment facilities are used 
for the illegal sale of medicines. This is equally shown in UK cases in which actors ran their 
illicit medicine business from legitimate business premises, taking advantage of a number of 
existing business contacts. Cases included an operation selling illicit medicines packaged as 
herbal remedies from a newsagent and online, operations running an online pharmacy 
alongside an Indian call centre and quad bike business, business partners running an illicit 
medicine business online in the UK alongside a pharmaceutical production factory in India, 
gym owners/business partners who saw the opportunity to sell steroids and related prescription 
drugs used to ‘bulk up’ to customers at their gym before expanding their business online, and 
suspects with previous involvement in the pharmaceutical industry operating front companies 
and well-versed in the use of offshore banking.  
Furthermore, the dispersal of such networks allows the circumvention of legal and 
regulatory systems. On occasion both the consumer and supplier – if based abroad in a country 
with an applicable license – are engaging in a completely legal business transaction. A 
prevalent example in the UK is Kamagra, a generic version of sildedfanil citrate (most 
commonly known by its brand name Viagra), which is a licensed medicine produced and sold 
to treat erectile dysfunction in India. In the UK, Kamagra is an unlicensed drug, yet is not 
controlled under the Misuse of Drugs Act. Therefore, it can be shipped to a UK consumer by 
an India supplier without either party engaging in a criminal act. 
Thus, the blurred boundaries between the legitimate, grey and illegitimate trading flows 
are highly reflected in the market for illicit medicines. We are not referring to a case of an 
illegal trade emerging in the shadows of a legal trade, but the constant and normalised blurring 
of the boundaries between legal and illegal businesses throughout various stages in the supply 
chain to the point that they often become symbiotic (see Passas, 2002; Naylor, 2004; Paoli and 
Donati, 2014). Put in Ruggiero’s (1996) terms, the trade is another example of a ‘dirty 
economy’, in so far as crime and the legal sector appear to mutually promote entrepreneurship. 
It is interesting to note that the legitimate actors are neither exploited by criminal networks nor 
simply provide support to the criminal networks knowingly or unknowingly (see also Ruggiero, 
2003; van Duyne, 2005; Vander Beken, 2005). They are what Morselli and Giguere (2006: 
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185) call ‘critical actors’, who drift from legality to illegality and back always within the 
confines and protection of their legal business (see also Kleemans and van de Bunt, 2008).  
 
The online trade 
Increasingly innovative and accessible information and communications technologies (ICTs) 
play a crucial role in the magnitude and nature of this and other illicit transnational commodity 
markets. In particular, late-modern technologies have not only accelerated the tempo in which 
new pharmaceutical products are introduced (Crary, 2014) but have also compressed the spatial 
and temporal features of illicit markets. On all levels, the illicit medicine market is flourishing 
on a variety of websites, such as online pharmacies, business-to-business websites, social 
media sites and darknets (see also Hall & Antonopoulos, 2015, 2016; Di Nicola et al., 2015; 
Koenraadt, 2015). For example, in this Dutch case, online pharmacies were used for the retail 
supply, while e-commerce was employed for the wholesale: 
 
Case 4 (NL): Family members 
Years of alleged offence: 2010-2012 
Between January 2010 and June 2012, multiple packages, parcels and envelopes confiscated 
by customs contained weight loss product Slimex and counterfeit medicines such as Viagra, 
Cialis and Levitra. In total 130,000 medicines related to this case were confiscated. The 
business revolved around two male family members and one fellow suspect. They 
communicated online with two manufacturing companies in China, where the production of 
Slimex medicines and packages took place. Packages and parcels were sent to various 
addresses related to the main suspect, such as addresses of family members, his company, 
business partners, and resellers. Medicines were sold online under the guise of official, 
legitimate or natural sexual products and weight loss methods, all registered with official 
account numbers. At least 14 different websites with legitimate payment systems were used for 
the sale of the medicines, including online pharmacies and e-commerce websites. 
Source: Dutch Public Prosecution Service 
 
Wholesalers, vendors, traders and consumers are easily able to order and sell illicit medicines 
online from a geographical distance without the need for face-to-face contact. As a result, some 
actors involved in the trade – although they function in collaboration with networks of other 
actors – never physically meet their suppliers or customers, and exchange data and facilitate 
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financial transactions from the privacy of their own homes and legal business premises. This 
was particularly apparent on social media websites when traders connected to online 
wholesalers were found to be conducting the entire process from wholesale to retail online, 
essentially bypassing criminal brokers who operate online pharmacies.  
The complex and flexible organisational network emphasises another pattern emerging 
from the data of both our studies: the blurring between online and offline processes in the 
context of the trade. Overall, suppliers and consumers do not specialise in online or offline 
trading methods. Rather, both online and offline trading methods are used in combination:  
 
Case 5 (UK): Gym business 
Year of alleged offence: 2007-2010 
A police investigation found 2 suspects selling anabolic steroids and prescription-only 
medicines both online and from a gym in Essex. Suspect 1 (who had been prosecuted in the 
past in relation to similar offences) ran and owned a gym frequented by those interested in 
bodybuilding. He began selling anabolic steroids and other prescription drugs he sourced from 
China to customers in his gym and over the Internet on a website he set up, which was 
purported to be selling protein shakes and supplements. He also set up merchant banking 
facilities to receive payments. Suspect 2 was an associate of Suspect 1 and worked in his gym. 
He also set up his own website to conduct similar activities. He would eventually buy Suspect 
1’s online business for £15,000.  
Source: MHRA case files 
 
Various online sites and payment facilities are simultaneously used by the same operation to 
sell illicit medicines. The actors in another UK case, for example, traded via email, a personal 
website set up as an online pharmacy, classified advertising sites and well-known online 
marketplaces. However, all sales were not necessarily completed online; the same suspect 
marketed products and completed orders over the telephone and in a shop using the PayPoint 
machine. At times these online and offline practices are intentionally alternated to diminish the 
chances of detection. For example, as one illegal trader in the Netherlands highlighted: “The 
control is now stricter and stricter, so my website is hosted outside Europe. Right now my 
website runs through India, so that they cannot get rid of mine. And you see, the justice 
department is focusing on this topic now, so we are not running everything through the internet 
anymore. Customers can usually find us online, and then they will receive a telephone number 
to place their orders” (Interview with Dutch illegal trader).  
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 Similarly, in terms of payments, e-commerce has simplified the process of buying and 
selling illicit goods, but also borrowing/renting the bank accounts of friends and family 
members and setting up offshore banking facilities are often used to obscure the virtual ‘paper 
trail’. Furthermore, in many instances those who produce and trade illicit medicines offline buy 
their primary materials online so their (offline) business is simply an extension of the online 
supply chain (see Management Today, 2013). Driven by the explosion in internet usage 
globally, e-commerce is booming in legitimate and illegitimate healthcare sectors. The Internet 
therefore acts as a ‘force multiplier’ (Yar, 2006: 10) in the advertising and marketing dimension 
of the trade by making it easier to set up sites and complete commercial transactions. However, 
although technological improvements have vastly expanded the market for illicit 
pharmaceuticals, connecting traders and consumers worldwide, at times the trade is clearly 
embedded in physical, offline locations, such as shops, markets and gyms (see Koenraadt, 
2015; Antonopoulos & Hall, 2016; Van de Ven, 2016). Indeed, as the cases above and other 
data illustrate, operations usually make use of a mixture of both online and offline tactics and 
techniques.  
 
Social organisation  
The social organisation of the operations analysed in both the studies suggest that connections 
in the trade are often made between friends, business partners and family members, or online. 
Case 2, summarised above, offered insight into the social organisation of a UK-based operation 
that was described as a ‘jigsaw of individuals’, male and female, who were members of a close-
knit group of family members and friends acting as teams situated in different geographical 
locations. This network of actors maintained a number of core organisational functions, which 
included distinct individuals or teams in close contact who play different roles within and 
between these organisational functions. This included purchasing stock, operating storage and 
packing units, re-routing postal packages, transporting the drugs, supporting and maintaining 
the ICTs used to advertise and trade online, or setting up and running offshore baking facilities 
and front companies. Smaller networks around friends, family and business partners were 
found in abundance in both pieces of research. Networks involving family members and 
friends, business partners and university students were identified: 
  
Case 6 (UK): Students 
Year(s) of alleged offence: 2011. 
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In 2011 the UK Border Agency began inspecting consignments destined for three separate 
addresses in the UK; one in London and two in Loughborough. The packages were being sent 
from an address in India. This led to the arrest of two male suspects. Both defendants were 
part of a large scale conspiracy to import unlicensed and counterfeit medicines used to treat 
erectile dysfunction and hair loss into the UK, with some for further onward distribution to 
other parts of Western Europe, including the Netherlands. This involved a number of other 
suspects who were implicated as drop shippers. Both defendants were students at 
Loughborough University and had previously shared an address. One male was suspected to 
be the owner or partner of a factory in Baroda, India, being used to supply the products. 
Seizures uncovered approximately 110,000 falsified medicinal products (including Sildenafil, 
Tadalafil and Finasteride) at three addresses. The total value of the products recovered was 
£610,000. Western Union had been used for payments. 
Source: MHRA files. 
 
However, there are also highly unorganized schemes of smaller businesses and individual 
entrepreneurs that acquire pharmaceuticals directly from the manufacturer and thus skip 
various levels of the distribution chain. For example, drop shippers are the ideal illustration of 
such semi-autonomous actors operating in networks. Our research across the UK and the 
Netherlands has shown cases of drop-shipper resellers who are not necessarily connected to a 
distributor but answer adverts they find online and become involved without ever meeting in 
person. Drop shippers are involved in re-routing goods in the supply chain and are usually paid 
per shipment. They receive orders from the main organisational actors to re-direct to other parts 
of the EU. Suspects were usually selling to customers and liaising with numerous suppliers via 
a number of email addresses.  
 Thus, especially because of the blurring boundaries between legitimate and illegitimate 
supply, and widening online opportunities, our data highlights that overall, networks of friends 
and family, as well as of smaller businesses and individual entrepreneurs are involved in the 
trade. On the one hand, actors are able to obtain pharmaceuticals directly from the 
manufacturers. On the other hand, some networks include various middlemen and traders who 
fulfil specific roles and wholesale import is related to high-end suppliers who trade the products 
in large quantities. Because wholesale suppliers are also moving towards the method of 
importing smaller quantities, the same tactics are employed but with more variation in scale.  
 
Discussion 
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There has been a perception that the global illicit medicine market is controlled by rigid, 
hierarchical, Mafia-type organisations. However, what clearly emerges from the two extensive 
research projects upon which this paper is based is that the market is facilitated by numerous 
small groups with varying coherence, and in the case of large-scale smuggling, networks, (see, 
for example, Reuter, 1983; Potter, 1994); although the presence of complex, flexible and 
shifting ‘social entities’ related to the business can still be discerned. There is no ‘organisation’ 
or ‘authority’, which enforces or directs practice to supposedly ‘members’ of such an 
‘organisation’. Instead what does exist in the described illegal markets are networks of action-
oriented individuals, who in most instances act for their personal interests and often on 
improvisation. Networks are the best vehicle for these illegal businesses since “…the most 
reliable flow of supply comes from myriad of small scale, uncoordinated firms. Having diverse 
sources for the illicit commodities means that if the regulators knock off one or a few, the 
market continues uninterrupted” (Beare and Naylor, 1999: 17). In some situations, the market 
is facilitated by skilful, sole individuals especially when the scale of the operations and the 
quantities of merchandise concerned are small (see von Lampe, 2007; Paoli, 2002).  
Overall, the image of the business that emerges from our examination of trade in the 
UK and the Netherlands is consistent with views of organised criminal activities as rather less 
robust from an organisational viewpoint. Our findings are in accordance with “a growing body 
of literature on organized crime in Western countries that shows that the great majority of 
illegal exchanges in Western countries are carried out by numerous, relatively small and often 
ephemeral enterprises” (Paoli, 2016: 11) that assemble on the basis of necessity and 
opportunity rather than authority and formal rationality (see Pearson and Hobbs, 2001; 
Bruinsma and Bernasco, 2004; Hobbs, 2013; Antonopoulos and Papanicolaou, 2014). With 
some exceptions the illicit medicine trade displays mostly a technical division of labour, 
according to skills and competencies without further elements of organisational direction or 
centralisation. Within this context, at the core of collaboration between and among 
entrepreneurs involved in the illicit supply of medicines often lie family or kinship 
relationships, and existing legitimate business connections that constitute a trust basis for 
criminal cooperation (von Lampe and Johansen, 2004), and their incorporation is a very 
effective strategy to reduce the vulnerability of illegal enterprises to law enforcement action. 
What von Lampe (2007) calls a ‘social microcosm’ of illegal entrepreneurs is of critical 
importance to the success of a trading scheme (see also van Duyne, 2000; Edwards and Levi, 
2008). The research has also identified business relationships generated and sustained online. 
These schemes might mirror offline schemes but without actors having to meet in person.  
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Our findings suggest that the trade in illicit medicines, an essentially ‘market-based’, 
entrepreneurial criminal activity (see Naylor, 2003), exemplifies the idea that crime and 
commercial activity are ‘half-brothers’ (van Duyne, 2005: 2). The illicit medicine market in 
the UK and the Netherlands offers a very clear indication of the ways in which the legal and 
the illegal are blurred. There is a wide perception that there is a clear boundary between the 
legal and the illegal market (van Duyne, 2003b); a perception that official and media accounts 
uphold. However, illegal marketers exploit opportunities for profit and benefit from the legal 
sector in various ways, just as legal businesses can also benefit from ‘organised crime’. The 
illicit markets presented in the current article are not always antagonistic or injurious (Passas, 
2002; see also Beare, 2003) to their legitimate counterparts or the legal sector as a whole. 
Criminality is not completely unknown to legitimate businesses and neither do criminals 
always live off legitimate business in a parasitic way (see von Lampe, 2016). Ruggiero’s 
concept of the ‘dirty economy’ mentioned earlier posits the existence of objective common 
interests linking together legitimate business and criminal conduct (Ruggiero, 1996; Ruggiero, 
2003). This highlights the essential and ubiquitous links between both legal and illegal sectors 
of the pharmaceutical business in global capitalism as a networked system of accumulation 
(Hall & Antonopoulos, 2016; see also Nordstrom 2007; Hudson 2015). 
Locating the British and Dutch markets in illicit medicines in the global supply chain, 
it becomes clear that both the UK and the Netherlands are integral yet distinctive hubs of 
production, transit and consumption in the organisation of the trade in the North-West region 
of Europe (Europol, 2008). Both countries are host to a large proportion of end-consumers. The 
UK specifically serves as a transit country and the Netherlands, while retaining its function as 
a transit country, is also increasingly used as a manufacturing hub. Our understanding of the 
organisation of the trade is best conceptualised as a ‘glocal’ networked market operating in the 
contexts of global trade liberalisation and technological innovation running in parallel with 
everyday national and local economies that straddle the legal and illegal (see Hobbs, 1998; 
Hobbs and Dunnighan, 1998; Hall & Antonopoulos, 2015). Referring to the particular market 
as the ideal transnational crime, as we saw earlier, would operate more as an “additional fear 
arouser” (van Duyne, 2004: 6; 2003a), rather than reveal the more essential and complex 
aspects of the business mentioned above. The trade in illicit medicines is constantly evolving 
in the broad contexts of a number of complex and interacting legal, technological, economic, 
cultural, social and psychological processes and forces. Implementing highly effective 
enforcement in Europe will continue to present challenges, with suppliers increasingly able to 
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adapt to and exploit new technological opportunities and trading methods as the demand for 
illicit pharmaceuticals continues to grow.  
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